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Abstract 
 
This paper is the first to offer an economic model of God and humanity as optimizing agents in 
the context of concrete belief archetypes (religious ‘contracts’) in Judeo-Christian theology. Data 
support the model’s unique predictions, despite their otherwise counterintuitive, unlikely nature. 
For example, the model requires that in one belief archetype, ‘good works’ not increase with 
strength of faith, as one might otherwise expect, and that what appears may be God’s dominant 
contract precisely balances divine penalties for reneging on promises with incentives to seek 
divine ‘gifts’—an equivalence supported in the data. 
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Background 
 
Few aspects of human behavior have escaped the scrutiny of economic analysis in recent 
decades. Religion is no exception. Iannaccone (1998) notes that more than 200 articles have been 
published on the economics of religion, examining topics from free riding in religious groups 
and their strategies for deterring free riding—for example, strict codes of behavior, dress, or 
belief—to the link between religious beliefs and economic outcomes.  
Economists have also joined sociologists in prominent collaborations to study religious 
affiliation, participation, and other related phenomena: Stark, Iannaccone, and Finke, for 
example, examine the “secularization” of Europe (1994), the economics of church and state 
(1997), as well as religion, science, and rationality (2001), and Sherkat examines religious 
affiliation and mobility (2001) and religious orientation and participation(1998).  
 Despite such an extensive literature, one that dates back as far as Adam Smith, some of 
the most fundamental questions in religion remain unexamined by economists: in economic 
terms, for example, what is the relationship between self and God? How do our beliefs about that 
relationship affect behavior? We pursue answers to these questions, expressed in terms of 
economic models of optimizing behavior. As economists, our purpose is not to argue for a 
particular theological view, but to apply economic models of optimizing behavior to understand 
how beliefs about God can affect economic behavior. (Mangeloja (2003)) notes that much 
controversy also still surrounds the nature and strength of the links between religious beliefs and 
economic behavior, and Gruber (2005) notes the difficulty in parsing out structural relationships 
between religious beliefs on the one hand, and economic behavior and consequences on the 
other: Factors that affect religiosity are also likely to affect outcomes due to the correlation 
between religiosity and other factors, such as ambition, ability, and intelligence. Indeed, the 
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range and variability of empirical findings in the area illustrate this problem. Iannaccone (1998), 
for example, surveys a number of studies that suggest religious beliefs and affiliation and 
economic outcomes are interrelated, e.g., Hause (1971), Chiswick (1983), Neumann (1986), and 
Glaeser and Glendon (1998), and Lehrer (2004) is also a recent example. Even so, the direction 
of causality is unclear, Iannaccone argues, due to the paucity of theoretical structures that yield 
clear empirical predictions; Religious beliefs and affiliations are neither sufficiently defined in 
economic terms, nor explicitly linked to particular behavior or outcomes through a formal 
theoretical structure. In particular, Iannaccone (1998) argues, economists do not have much to 
say about beliefs.   
 One way of modeling religious beliefs  is to introduce both individual and divine utility 
functions, where individual perceptions of divine utility reflect beliefs. Even so, only two works, 
Brahms (1980) and Oslington (2005), model divine preferences, and only the latter models both 
divine and human utility. The former, Brahms (1980), models divine preferences without giving 
them an explicit representation. Briefly, God values belief over nonbelief, tests individuals by 
giving them genuine choices in which they may renege on promises and imposes constraints on 
human activity. Oslington (2005) poses the problem as a divergence between the preferences of 
God and those of individuals; faith is implicit and expressed as conformity to divine will. Our 
formal approach here more closely matches Oslington’s work, in that God engages in optimizing 
behavior and gains utility from ‘good works’, but we expand that approach by considering 
concrete belief archetypes from Judeo-Christian theology about the relationship between God 
and humanity and by conducting formal tests of the model’s predictions. We consider four 
primary belief archetypes and test their predictions using individual survey data. 
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 The use of an explicit theoretical model incorporating both God and humanity and the 
application of empirical tests of those predictions distinguish this study from prior work.  
 Even so, In addition to relying on the strength of model’s predictions to help sort the 
‘wheat from the chaff’ (of spurious correlation), our tests also focus on two central predictions 
that either run counter to intuitively likely correlations (e.g. that good works do not rise with 
strength of religious faith among believers), or that at a minimum, are unlikely to arise 
spuriously by chance. For example, the belief archetype that appears to be the dominant 
‘contract’ for God in our model avoids the necessity of imposing a divine penalty to deter 
reneging (both undesirable to God) by precisely balancing humanity’s incentives to avoid divine 
penalties with incentives to seek divine gifts—a balance that appears unlikely to arise by chance. 
 To be clear, though, several points should be clarified before proceeding. We use the 
term ‘humanity’s perception of God’ and ‘God’ as an entity interchangeably. Similarly, we use 
‘humanity’ and ‘self’ interchangeably. Also, while some may find the application of economic 
methods to religion distasteful or possibly even offensive, neither is our intention, despite our 
facetious title: "The Economist’s Guide to Heaven”—inspired by the provocative book, “God the 
Economist,” (Meeks, 1999).Subsequently, we have also become aware of ‘Is God an 
Economist,’ Wagner (2009). For both God and humanity, behavior in our model follows the 
standard economic paradigm – each is characterized as an optimizing agent in the context of 
concrete archetypes of Judeo-Christian beliefs. The results of our application of an economic 
model and empirical tests to religious beliefs and behavior may surprise both those critical of an 
economic approach and those sympathetic to it, alike: among believers, for example, we find a 
central, possibly dominant, role for a belief archetype involving transforming’ faith and divine 
‘gifts’—a result not likely anticipated by either view of the application of rational-choice 
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approaches to religion. Of course, no model can fully capture the rich theology of any major 
religion, and Judeo-Christianity is but one of the world’s great religious traditions. Our 
theoretical objective is modest: to capture a few essential aspects of Judeo-Christian beliefs in 
economic terms simple enough form to yield clear, testable predictions; many details of the 
model are necessarily secondary to that objective.  
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The Model 
Assumptions 
 
  Individuals act to maximize utility, which depends positively on consumption of a 
generic composite good (C) and production of good works (G), as described in equation (1) 
below.2  Equation (1) also contains a term V, determined by God.  This term represents the 
possibility of a direct, divine augment to human utility, as discussed further below. Individuals 
maximize a simple linear utility function of the form:  
         (1)        U C hG V= + +  
C may be produced with human labor or provided by God as a gift or reward. Human production 
of C (CH) is subject to a linear (constant returns to scale) relationship between the amount of 
labor (time or effort) an individual devotes to producing goods (LC) and the amount of the good 
produced (CH).  The parameter δ measures individual productivity in producing consumption 
goods, either directly or indirectly: 
(2)  H CC Lδ=  
 Good works (G) can only be produced using humanity’s labor:  
(3) G CG L L=  
Labor devoted directly to good works (LG) and labor devoted to producing C (LC) are 
complements in producing good works. Positive inputs into the production of both C and good 
works are necessary for good works to be performed, i.e., they are complements for example, in 
the sense that works and rest or work and food are complements in producing ‘effective’ labor 
time. In choosing LG and LC, individuals may not exceed the total amount of time available, 
denoted L (e.g., 24 hours a day): 
                                                 
2 The composite good C may include both tangible and nontangible, or spiritual goods. 
  
7
(4)       G CL L L+ =  
 God may use three instruments to influence individual behavior in the model—rewards 
(b), penalties (T), and gifts (V).  The “gift” is a direct, divine augment to utility. God rewards 
individuals for labor devoted to good works. This reward is in units of C and for simplicity, is 
assumed to take the linear form:  
(5)      G GC bL=  
The parameter b is the reward God promises to provide for time devoted to good works, and CG 
denotes the total C promised by God in exchange for time spent in good works.  God may 
penalize individuals who renege on their promises. The penalty, T, takes the form of a lump-sum 
reduction in C, and may also choose to make gifts to humanity (V), as explained below, which 
directly increase individual utility.  
 God derives utility from good works and disutility from invoking penalties instead of 
bestowing gifts. Individuals, indexed by i, contribute to God’s welfare through the performance 
of good works. For convenience, God’s utility function, Ω, is defined (or perceived) as the 
simple sum of the good works produced by humanity less a fixed disutility, ε, which is positive 
and finite if God must use a penalty: 
(7)    
1
N
i
i
G ε
=
Ω = −∑     for i=1, N: 
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Believers and Nonbelievers   
 Individuals are born as either believers or nonbelievers. Believers are born as either 
trusting, those who believe God’s promises, or doubting, those who believe in God but do not 
trust God’s promises.3 Any type of believer may renege on promises to God.   
 For believers, total human consumption, C, includes not only goods produced with 
individual labor, C = δ(LC), but also rewards from God for time committed to goods works, CG = 
b (LG), less penalties (T) for reneging on agreements with God. That is,  
     (7) ( )G GC L L L Tδ= − + −  
For nonbelievers, individual consumption is: 
(8) ( )GC L Lδ= −  
Information  
 Without cost, God observes each individual’s status as a believer or nonbeliever, utility 
functions, and actual behavior. Furthermore, God understands the basis for individual action – 
optimizing behavior subject to constraints – and the effect divine rewards and gifts have on 
individual behavior. Individuals believe God offers alternative relationships, or arrangements to 
humanity, knowing that believers maximize utility subject to the terms of an arrangement.  
Thus, individuals evaluate God’s offer based on whether they trust God’s promises, respond to 
God with promises of their own, and make time/resource allocation decisions to maximize their 
utility. Their utility maximizing decisions depend on God’s choice of reward (b) and gift (V), in 
the case of believers, but are independent of those choices for nonbelievers. Individuals only 
observe the utility of others who accept the same type of contract, including ‘no contract’ in the 
case of nonbelievers. Payoffs are realized after decisions are complete.   
                                                 
3 The assumption that ‘belief ‘ is innate in origin appears consistent with recent evidence on 
genetic origins of belief, the so-called ‘God gene’ described in Hamer (2005). 
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Contracts and Outcomes 
 We consider four primary belief archetypes (‘contracts’) in Judeo-Christian theology, 
which we assume God offers to induce individuals to increase good works, where, again, we use 
God and individual perceptions of God interchangeably. Empirically, these belief archetypes are 
associated with particular religious affiliations. Biblical context for the specific belief archetypes 
and details of the church-sect typology we use to infer which religious contract a respondent is 
identified with are provided in a data & biblical appendix, available to interested readers by 
request. 
1 Ex Post Contracts 
 Under ‘ex post’ contracts, rewards are conditional on observed individual actions and 
delivered ex post if the terms of the contract are kept.  Under an ex post contract God promises to 
pay a “price” b for each unit of labor spent on good works. Trusting believers, doubting 
believers, and nonbelievers respond to the offer in different ways.  Hence, from humanity’s 
perspective, God solves the following problem: 
Max iGΩ =∑  subject to LG=LTG 
Where  LTG solves the maximization problem for trusting believers: 
G C
G C
H C
G G
H G
G
Max      U= C+hG
L ,L
s.t.
L +L =L
C = L
C =bL
C=C +C
G=L(L-L )
δ  
with these first-order conditions for an interior maximum:  
 
  
10
bhLhL
dL
dU
G
G
+−+−== 20 δ
( )
2 2
( )
2 2
H
G
H
E
L bL
h
L bL
h
δ
δ
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With ‘free will’, these conditions pose constraints to God’s optimization, which 
yields God’s first-order condition with respect to b, the reward for good work: 
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h
b
db
d δ−−==Ω  
 
Doubting believers, who do not trust God’s promises, and nonbelievers, who do not believe the 
reward (b) exists are both unresponsive. Neither group responds to God’s promises with 
additional time spent in good works; the first-order condition for an interior maximum for 
doubting believers and nonbelievers does not contain b: 
 G
G
LhLh
dL
dU )(2)(0 −+−== δ  
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A corner solution arises if Lh >)/(δ . When the ratio of the marginal productivity of LC  in 
producing C to the marginal utility of good works,( h/δ ), is sufficiently high, both doubting 
believers and nonbelievers set LG, the input into good works, at 0 and set LC, the input into 
production of C, at L. First-order conditions for ex post contracts are presented in Table 1, and 
their implications  are summarized below for individuals with varying strengths of belief: 
General Observations for Ex Post Contracts 
   
i) Strength of faith among believers is relevant. Trusting believers respond to God’s promise by 
 putting more resources into good works than either doubting believers or nonbelievers. 
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 ii) Both doubting believers and nonbelievers are unresponsive.   
 
iii) Indeed, doubt and nonbelief are equivalent. Doubting believers are no better off than  
 
nonbelievers. Both are unresponsive and have equivalent good works, all else the same. 
 
iv) God optimizes, by setting b=δ  
 
v) God is better off when humanity has faith in his promises; faith leads to increased good  
 
works, increasing God’s utility, at least from humanity’s perspective. 
 
2. Ex Ante Contracts without a Penalty 
 Because only trusting believers respond to God's promises under an ex post contract, 
God offers ‘ex ante’ contracts, in which rewards are offered ex ante, with a price conditional on 
promise of future performance. Ex ante contracts can be with or without a penalty. In an ex ante 
contract without a penalty, God is perceived as offering rewards ‘up front’, inducing doubting 
believers to enter into the contract, and trusting and doubting believers behave equivalently in 
the absence of a penalty, because all believers have an incentive to renege on promises and 
reduce good works, consuming ‘up front’ and then devoting additional labor to own production 
of consumption. Thus, all believers gain additional utility by reneging on good works; First-
order conditions are now identical for all individuals: 
   G
G
LhLh
dL
dU )(2)(0 −+−== δ
 
    
2 2
2 2
H
G
H
E
LL
h
LL
h
δ
δ
= −
= +
 
 
The first-order conditions for contracts with rewards delivered ex ante are given in Table 2 for 
interior solutions, with their implications summarized below:  
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General Observations for Ex Ante Contracts without a penalty 
 
i) Strength of faith among believers is now irrelevant: all believers renege. 
 
ii) Even trusting believers renege. Trusting believers also take the ex ante reward,  
 
and then renege, yielding greater utility than doubting believers or nonbelievers.  
 
iii) With no penalty, doubting believers are better off than nonbelievers:  
 
If doubting believers take God’s ex ante contract and then renege, they are better  
 
off than nonbelievers, who remain unresponsive. 
 
3. Ex Ante Contracts with a Penalty 
Knowing that individuals have an incentive to renege on ex ante contracts, God invokes 
a penalty for reneging on promises of good works. The penalty is chosen by God to just 
induce believers at the margin to keep their promises and increase good works to meet 
the terms of the contract. Under this arrangement, all believers are now responsive to 
God’s promises.  However, God’s utility is reduced, at least from humanity’s perspective 
by the imposition of a penalty, and first-order conditions are summarized in Table 3 when 
the penalty is set just high enough to induce trusting and doubting believers to change the 
time spent in good works to the level chosen in ex post contracts, that is: / 2GL L= . 
Implications of these conditions are summarized below: 
 General Observations for Ex Ante Contracts with Penalty 
 
i) The effect on God's utility is indeterminate. The additional good works increase God’s utility,  
 
but the penalty reduces God utility. Whether God’s utility increases or not is indeterminate. 
 
ii) Believers are responsive, and no longer renege: The penalty eliminates the incentive to  
 
renege and results in greater good works and utility for believers than nonbelievers. 
 
iii) All believers are better off than nonbelievers. Believers receive additional utility from both  
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a higher level of good works and C.  
 
iv) Doubting believers behave like trusting believers, rather than nonbelievers. The combination  
 
of an ex ante contract with a sufficiently large penalty induces doubting believers to behave like  
 
trusting believers.  
 
v) As before, nonbelievers are unresponsive. All else the same, nonbelievers’ choices lead to  
 
fewer good works and lower utility than for believers because they do not participate in God's  
 
rewards.  
 
4. Covenants 
  God can offset incentives to renege in an ex ante contract by imposing a penalty for doing 
so, but the penalty represents disutility to God. However, God can avoid the need to impose 
penalties by offering a ‘covenant’—a direct divine augment to utility, offered conditional on 
‘transforming faith’, that is, faith sufficient to preclude reneging. (trusting believers in a covenant 
for example, may believe that God ‘sees’ any inclination to renege, which would exempt them, 
from the perspective of their own belief, from receiving the divine gift promised in the 
covenant).  If the direct augment is sufficiently high at the margin, believers in a covenant 
produce good works in covenants equivalent to those under an ex ante contracts with a penalty. 
That is, by design, incentives to avoid divine penalty are precisely balanced with incentives to 
seek divine gifts, so that all else the same, the level of good works in a covenant is the same as in 
an ex ante contract with a penalty but without requiring a penalty. The first-order conditions for a 
covenant are summarized in Table 4, and their implications are summarized below: 
General Observations for Covenants: 
(i) Covenants, ex post and ex ante contracts(with penalty) are  
 
(ii) equivalent : good works in rows 1-3 are now identical. 
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(iii) Utility is higher for believers than for nonbelievers for an interior solution.   
 
 
(iv) God and all believers are at least as well off as with an ex ante contract with  
 
a penalty, for V > ( h4/2δ ). 
  Testable Hypotheses 
We focus on tests of three central predictions of the model using self-reported data for 
strength of faith and contract type (as identified by religious affiliation), income, religious 
donations, religious attendance, and other standard demographic controls:  
H1:Strength of faith is irrelevant among believers in ex ante contracts without a penalty. ( all 
believers renege).  
 
H2: Ex ante contracts without a penalty do not ‘work’ (believers renege if there is no penalty), so 
without a penalty, ‘good works’ are lower among believers in ex ante contracts than in ex post 
contracts) 
 
H3 Covenants ‘work’ (by design, good works under a covenant are as high as in ex ante contracts 
with a penalty, but without requiring a penalty, which represents disutility to God).  
 
We are particularly interested in tests of (1) and (3) because they require particularly 
strong, or counterintuitive results: (1) requires that contrary to priors, good works among 
believers not increase with strength of faith, and (3) requires that the prospect of gifts promised 
by God under a covenant and the prospect of penalties for reneging on promises in an ex ante 
contract induce equivalent levels of good works, a result that appears unlikely to arise purely by 
chance. Hence, we have no reason to suspect that either of these two implications of the model is 
likely to arise spuriously in the data. 
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Data and Empirical Specifications  
 Following work by Iannacone, we use individual cross-sectional data from the General 
Social Science Survey (GSS), which the National Opinion Research Center initially conducted in 
1972. The data are independently drawn from approximately 1500 personal interviews with 
English speaking, non-institutionalized people in the U. S. ages 18 or older. In addition to 
questions concerning religious preferences, asked over the entire period, the survey asked a 
variety of additional questions in the subsequent years of  1991 and 1988 concerning the degree 
of faith in God, religious donations, participation in religious activities, and belief in heaven, hell 
and the devil. The GSS data include  nonbelievers, as well.  Analysis is restricted to the years 
1988 and 1991 because only those years include relevant measures of good works (religious 
donations, and attendance) . We rely primarily on the 1991data because beliefs in hell or the 
devil, useful for assessing the effects of beliefs in penalties, are recorded only in 1991. Even so, 
we also perform secondary tests based on a reduced specification and the less comprehensive 
1988 data. Our tests focus either on the model’s counterintuitive predictions for the role of 
strength of faith for a given contract type, or on the role of religious affiliation and contract type 
for a given strength of faith.  The tests suggest substantial power for the model’s predictions. As 
a general proposition, our model suggests that an individual’s investment of time in good works 
depends on both strength of faith and beliefs about the nature of the divine contract.   
  We use religious donations and participation as measures of good works because they are 
readily available in the GSS data, while other potentially useful measures, such as non religious 
volunteer time or donations to other charitable groups or activities, are not. 
 S, Our two alternate measures of good works are the percentage of income donated to religious 
organizations or activities and the approximate percentage of the year devoted to religious 
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attendance and activities. Explanatory variables include self-reported measures of strength of 
belief, beliefs about the divine contract, as revealed by religious affiliation, and interactions of 
the two. We are particularly interested in the interactions because comparisons of the interaction 
terms form the basis for the empirical tests of the model’s predictions. To capture strength of 
faith, the specification includes binary variables identifying ‘trusting believers’ (TB), ‘doubting 
believers’ (DB), and ‘nonbelievers’ (NB), as identified from self responses. Specific definitions 
of these and other variables are presented in a data Appendix. Individuals also implicitly report 
(via religious affiliation) the type of contract he or she believes they have accepted from God, if 
any: that is, an ex post contract (EXP), an ex ante contract without a penalty (EXA), an ex ante 
contract with a penalty (PEN), a covenant (COV), or no contract (NOC).4  
 Trusting and doubting believers may enter into ex post contracts (TBEXP, DBEXP, 
respectively, ex ante contracts without a penalty (TBEXA, DBEXA, respectively), ex ante contracts 
with a penalty (TBPEN, DBPEN, respectively), or covenants (TBCOV, DBCOV, respectively). The 
reference category includes nonbelievers (NB) who choose not to enter into a contract (NOC). 
Again, variable definitions are provided in Table 5 Summary statistics are reported in table 6. Our 
full base specification, eq. (9) below, includes these interaction terms, along with the main effects 
for strength of faith and religious ’contract’ variables, but the results are robust to an expanded 
specification that includes extensive individual controls for prior religious experience, race, gender, 
marital status, employment, family background, and geographic region:  
(9) GWi= (β0+ β1TBi+ β2DBi+ β3COVi+ β4EXAi+ β5EXPi+ β6PENi+ β7COVi+ β8TBEXPi+ β9TBEXAi + β10TBPENi+       
β11DBCOVi+ β12DBEXPi+ β13DBEXAi+ β14DBPENi+εi) 
                                                 
4 biblical context for the contract archetypes is provided in a biblical appendix, available by 
request. 
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 Our model’s three key hypotheses are specified below in terms of the interaction terms 
between given strengths of faith and specific religious contracts, as identified from religious 
affiliation: 
H1 β9= β13 (strength of faith is irrelevant in ex ante contracts with no penalty). 
H2 (β8>β9, β12>β13) ex ante contracts don’t ‘work’ without a penalty: (good works in EXP 
contracts >than in ex ante contracts with no penalty for both TB and DB). 
H3 covenants ‘work’ (β7=β9, β11=β14) (good works in COV= those in EXA with a penalty, but 
require no penalty). 
Church-sect typology 
 A key step in our empirical specification is identifying individual beliefs about the type 
of religious ‘contract’ they have chosen. However, there are no questions in the GSS data 
regarding religious ‘contracts’, in the sense of our model. To infer contract type from religious 
affiliation, we rely on prior work on church-sect typologies of beliefs, e.g., Iannaccone (1998), 
and Johnson (1953, 1967), further augmented by interviews of Ben Johnson (2009), arguably the 
leading scholar on church-sect typology in the sociology of religion.5 Iannaccone distinguishes 
among liberal Protestants, conservative Protestants, and Catholics. Why does the church-sect 
typology take this shape? Azzi and Ehrenberg’s early study (1975) suggests that expected after-
life rewards may be higher for ‘strict’ conservative cohorts and may result in increased 
attendance and contributions. Some have suggested that another reason for this typology may lie 
in the ‘addictive’ effects of religion (in the Becker sense) ; ‘strict’ conservative groups acquire 
greater religious human capital, yielding higher religious attendance and donations  
                                                 
5 Johnson (2009) 
 
8 Results in Table 6 are also broadly consistent with an earlier studies of church attendance, e.g.,      
(Long and Settle (1977) and Lipford and Tollison (2003). 
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 There is both empirical merit and precedent for this approach. Glaeser and Glendon 
(1998) for example, appear to identify Catholicism with ex post contracts in which good works 
are motivated by  the future reward of’ getting into heaven’. There is historical precedent for this 
distinction as well; at the time of the Reformation, Protestants distinguished themselves from 
Catholics by stressing (in our terminology) the importance of transforming faith and need for 
covenants rather than ex post contracts. Similarly, liberal Protestantism is associated with higher 
critical biblical scholarship which appears consistent with ex ante contracts in which God  
demonstrates promises ‘up front’ to motivate acceptance of the contract. Thus, we assume that 
individual differences in religious affiliation are highly correlated with variations in religious 
beliefs. We proceed by identifying Catholics with ex post contracts; liberal Protestants and Jews 
with ex ante contracts without a penalty; conservative Protestants with covenants, and 
respondents who think the devil definitely exists with ex ante contracts with a penalty. A 
complete listing of contract variables by religious/denominational type is provided in a data 
appendix available to interested readers. The omitted contractual category, ‘no contract,’ 
includes respondents answering ‘none or other.’   
 Complete data for 1988 comprise 891 observations, and  complete data for the year 1991 
comprise 918 observations. 
 We begin with estimates of the full specification of eel (9) using data for 1991 and 
religious attendance as the measure of good works because data for religious donations are not 
available in 1991, which precludes using donations as a measure of good works in 1991, and data 
for beliefs in the devil or hell are not available in 1988, which precludes using the 1988 data to 
estimate the full specification. However, we are able to estimate a reduced specification for a 
second year with 1988 data that excludes any penalty-related variables. This reduced 
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specification has the disadvantage of not permitting any tests of penalty-related parameters, but it 
does permit other key tests, while also offering one key advantage: The 1988 data contain 
information for both religious donations and  religious participation. We exploit this feature 
using canonical correlation, which yields both an estimate of the marginal tradeoff between 
religious attendance ( ‘time’ ) and donations (‘ money’ ) as measures of good works and tests of 
a subset of the model’s predictions based on a broader measure of good works, a canonical 
composite of religious attendance and donations) 
Religious attendance  in the 1991 data is divided into nine categories; including never, 
less than once per year, once per year, several times per year, once per month, two to three times 
per month, nearly every week, every week, and more than once per week, so we construct an 
approximately continuous variable from these categories that measures the approximate 
percentage of yearly attendance and takes a value of zero if the respondent never attends, two if 
the respondent attends less than once per year, once per year or several times per year, twenty 
five if the respondent attends once per month or two to three times per month and 100 if the 
respondent attends every week, or nearly every week, or more than once per week. This scale is 
consistent, but arbitrary, and likely overstates the proportion of time spent in religious activities, 
if measured in hourly increments, but this issue does not pose a problem, because all our 
hypothesis tests are based on relative magnitudes of coefficients and hence, scale invariant. 
Again, variables are defined in the data and biblical appendix, available by request. Summary 
data for the regression and Tobit variables are presented in Table 5.  
Estimation 
Our measure of good works in 1991 (ATT) is a latent variable, observed only for non-
negative values. However both OLS and Tobit estimates of eq.(9) are presented in Table 6; some 
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of our  cell sizes are small, so we prefer OLS for its small-sample properties, unless significant 
bias is indicated by Tobit estimates, and we expect little bias, because the proportion of 
observations with zeros is small (<30%) in the data. Even so, we compare the OLS and Tobit 
estimates in Table 6 to assess whether bias in the OLS estimates is, in fact, small. 
 The ordinary least squares (OLS) and (marginal) Tobit coefficients for the full model 
specification and the 1991 data are presented in columns (1) and (2), respectively of Table 6, 
with religious attendance/participation as the dependent variable. The OLS and Tobit (marginal) 
coefficients exhibit generally similar values, suggesting little bias for OLS. The similarity is 
evident in two ways. First, significant coefficients in the Tobit estimates are generally associated 
with significant coefficients in OLS and insignificant coefficients in Tobit are associated with 
insignificant coefficients in OLS.  Second, when both coefficients are significant, their 
magnitudes tend to be similar. Most importantly, for the fully specified model, the patterns of 
significance and coefficient magnitudes are equivalent for the interaction terms, which are the 
only coefficients  relevant to our hypothesis tests. Consequently, we rely on OLS due to its 
greater power in small samples, and again, results are robust to whether or not an expanded set of 
standard demographic controls ( e.g., gender, race, age, marital status, geographic region, and 
house hold income) are included. 
Hypothesis Tests 
based on the estimates in Table 6, tests of our three major hypotheses are consistent with the 
model predictions: Even so, we focus primarily on hypotheses 1 and 3, our two most central and 
powerful predictions.8 Hypothesis 1, the model’s most counterintuitive prediction, is not rejected 
(p< .05) : without a penalty for reneging in ex ante contracts, strength of faith among believers is 
irrelevant for good works, measured as religious attendance and participation, even though the 
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independent effects of strength of faith (coefficients for TB and DB) are substantial in 
magnitude, and statistically significant from both zero and each other, which suggests substantial 
power for the tests. In addition, hypothesis 3, that covenants ‘work,’ and arguably, the least 
likely to arise merely by chance, is also not rejected: for a given strength of faith among 
believers, attendance, the measure of good works in Table 6, does not differ significantly 
between covenants (which promise divine gifts for transforming faith) and either ex ante  
-tracts with a penalty (which promise divine penalties for reneging on promises of good works) 
or ex post contracts). Furthermore, one also cannot reject the hypothesis 2, that penalties ‘work’: 
among believers with a given strength of faith, attendance is significantly higher in ex ante 
contracts with a penalty than without, so failure to reject hypothesis 3 does not appear solely due 
to low power, since this related test does discriminate successfully between ex ante contracts 
with and without a penalty.  
We turn now to a broader, composite measure of good works, a canonical correlation for 
ATT and GIV, available together only in 1988), along with a subset of the independent variables 
from eq. (9) available for use in the restricted specification. This estimator permits us to conduct 
robustness tests of a subset of our hypotheses, hypotheses 1 and 3, for a broader measure of good 
works, while also yielding an estimate of the tradeoff between the two, if only for a restricted 
specification that excludes any penalty-related variables, (questions dealing with belief in the 
devil or hell were not asked in 1988) . Still, we are able to test hypotheses 1 and 3 in the 
restricted specification.  
 Income is reported only as a categorical variable in , so we construct an approximately 
continuous income variable, with values taken from the midpoint of each income category 
ranging from $5,000 to $65,000. This approach likely understates income for the top range, and 
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overstates it for the bottom range, but these ranges account for a small minority of our 
observations. We employ  canonical correlation, which permits us to test hypotheses using both 
measures of good works simultaneously. Canonical correlation estimates the linear combination 
of dependent variables (in this case, religious donations and attendance) and independent 
variables (strength of belief and contractual variables with their interactions) that maximizes the 
correlation between the two. (Theil (1971), 317-318) Canonical correlation is valuable here for 
several reasons. It allows for a two-dimensional measure of good works consisting of both 
religious donations and attendance, rather than a uni-dimensional measure and yields an estimate 
for the tradeoff, if any, between time and monetary donations. It also provides an opportunity to 
gauge the robustness of our tests of  hypotheses 1 and 3, those not involving penalties, in a 
different context—one based on a two-dimensional ‘composite’ measure of good works.   
 Table 7 presents estimates based on the canonical correlations.9 The results exhibit a 
negative tradeoff  between time and money used for religious purposes, and the upper and lower 
bounds of the 5% confidence intervals for the canonical weights for religious donations and 
attendance imply a (negatively) elastic tradeoff over the full range.10  
 The tests we are able to perform for the canonical correlations in Table 7 are also 
consistent with the model predictions: the canonical estimates do not reject hypothesis 1, the 
notion, at the heart of our model, that in the absence of a penalty for reneging in ex ante 
contracts, all believers face an incentive to renege, so strength of faith among believers is 
irrelevant to good works. The canonical estimates also do not reject hypothesis 3, that levels of 
                                                 
9 Given little evidence of bias for OLS in Table6, we also presume little bias for canonical 
correlation in Table 7. 
10 A confidence interval for the elasticity is not estimated directly because the variance of the 
elasticity, a ratio of two random normal variables, is ill defined, and fortunately, none of our 
formal hypothesis tests rely on the elasticity. 
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good works are equivalent in covenants and ex post contracts. However, unlike our hypothesis 
tests for the OLS results in Table 6, where the power of the tests appears strong, power for the 
tests based on the canonical results appears weaker. Even so, results for the two sets of tests 
coincide, despite substantively different specifications, so with, any issue with the difference in 
power is  a moot issue. 
 More broadly, trusting believers appear less responsive to sanctions than doubting 
believers, but appear just as willing to renege and reduce good works in ex ante contracts if there 
is no real or perceived penalty for doing so, e.g., good works of trusting believers are no greater 
under ex ante contracts with a penalty than without. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study provides an economic model and empirical evidence of systematic links between 
major archetypes of Judeo-Christian beliefs and optimizing economic behavior for both God and 
humanity. Empirical tests of  otherwise unlikely, counterintuitive predictions of the model lend 
support to the power of economic models of the links between religious beliefs and behavior. 
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Table 1. First-Order Conditions: Ex Post Contracts. 
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Table 2. First- Order Conditions: Ex Ante Contracts No Penalty 
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See text for explanation of parameters and variables.
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Table 3.  First-Order Conditions: Ex Ante Contracts 
with Penalty. 
 
Trusting Believers  Nonbelievers 
Doubting Believers   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
See text for explanation of parameters and variables.
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Table 4. First-order Conditions: Covenants   
Trusting Believers Nonbelievers 
Doubting Believers 
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See text for explanation of parameters and variables.
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Table 5. Summary Statistics for Table 6 & 7 Variables)1991) 
   *1988   
( *only) 
GIV .0442 
(.2448) 
                    
ATT ..3361 
(.4234) 
 
   
INC  20866.83 
(14575.85)
TB  .524 
 (.4997) 
DB .2876 
 (.4529) 
NB  .1885     
 (.3913) 
EXP  .2658 
 (.442) 
EXA  .1688 
 (.3748) 
PEN                 .061 
 (.2395) 
COV  .4074 
 (.4916) 
NOC  .0969 
 (.2961) 
TBEXP  .1536 
 (.3608) 
TBEXA  .0545 
 (.2271) 
TBPEN  .0501 
 (.2183) 
TBCOV  .2527 
 (.4348) 
TBNOC   .0131 
 (.1136) 
DBEXP  .0806 
 (.2724) 
DBPEN  .0076 
(.087) 
DBCOV  .0871 
DBNOC (.282) 
  .0425 
 
GSS data, 1988, 1991, see text and data 
appendix. 
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        Table 6.  Estimates: Full Model (1991) 
Estimator 
 
OLS 
coefficients 
(std error) 
TOBIT 
marginal 
coefficients 
(std error) 
Dependent 
var 
ATTEND ATTEND 
 
Specification 
 
FULL 
 
FULL 
TB    23.87*       
31.394*** 
 (12.4) (12.114) 
 OLS 
(1991) 
TOBIT 
(1991) 
DB 1.879 4.995 
 (5.69) (9.012) 
EXP 13.22* 31.474*** 
 (7.22) (9.104) 
   
EXA 29.34*** 47.599*** 
 (8.10) (8.424) 
PEN 34.62 55.330*** 
 (24.6) (20.540) 
COV 39.77*** 52.128*** 
 (6.90) (7.835) 
TBEXP 4.650 -8.992 
 (14.4) (13.959) 
TBEXA -32.62** -29.902** 
 (15.3) (14.077) 
   
TBPEN -16.77 -23.219 
 (28.2) (23.471) 
TBCOV -18.75 -25.438 
 (14.0) (13.044) 
DBEXP 2.406 -4.203 
 (9.55) (11.723) 
DBEXA -27.01*** -21.466 
 (9.67) (11.290) 
   
DBPEN -28.78 -25.401 
 (28.3) (25.295) 
DBCOV -33.00*** -26.806** 
 (8.85) (10.718) 
nobbs 918 918 
R2/Log L 0.15 -4263.12 
** p<.05 ***p<.01  
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Table 7.  Canonical Correlation (1988). Restricted specification                
Dep/indep 
variables 
  
ATT                             .0237***  
    (.019)  
GIV    -.0469  
    (.032)  
TB  1.060*  
   (.60)  
DB     .098  
  (0.54)  
EXP  1.10  
   (.99)  
EXA   .0836  
   (.79)  
COV   1.415 
(1.26) 
 
TBEXP     .809  
   1.10)  
TBEXA   .748  
  (0.89)  
TBCOV  1.305  
   1.34)  
DBEXA   0.748  
  (0.89)  
nobs      891  
*     
Dependent variables are % time and % income devoted to religious groups See text for 
Description of data and variables.( *p<.10 **p<.05 *** p<.01) 
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Table A1. Variable Definitions. 
Variable            Definition 
GIV Contributions as percentage of income in 1990 dollars 
ATT Approximate percentage of yearly attendance measured in weeks 
INC Income in 1990 dollars 
TB Respondents who know God exists 
DBTBEL Respondents who have doubts or believe sometimes or believe in a higher 
power but not necessarily a personal God 
 
NB  Respondents who either don't believe in God or think there is no way to 
find out 
EXP  Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent was Catholic 
 
EXA Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent identified with an ex ante 
contract and did not believe in the devil (1991 sample)  
 
  
EXPEN Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent identified with an ex ante 
contract and believed in the devil (1991 sample) 
  
COV Dummy variable takes a value of 1 if respondent was a Baptist, Missouri 
Synod Lutheran, other or non-denominational Protestant 
 
NOC Respondents either answered none or other for religious affiliation 
TBEXP Trusting believers  who  identify with ex post contracts 
TBEXA Trusting believers who identify with ex ante contracts (1988  and 1991 
samples) 
 
TBXA Trusting believers  who identify with ex ante contracts without a penalty 
(1991 sample)  
TBPEN Trusting believers who  identify with ex ante contracts with a penalty 
(1991 sample)  
 
TBCOV Trusting believers who  identify with covenants 
 
DBEXP Doubting believers  who identify with ex post contracts  
DBEXA Doubting believers who  identify with ex ante contracts (1988 and 1991 
samples)  
DBPEN DB who identify with ex ante contracts with a penalty(1991)  
DBCOV Doubting believers who identify with covenants.   
NBEXP Nonbelievers who enter into an ex post contract 
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Table A1 continued: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
NOC   not identified with any contract 
 
NBPEN                      NB respondents identified with EXA contracts and who believe in  
                                    the devil 
 
Note: see text and references for explanation and source of data. 
 
Table A.2. Church-sect contract typology  
CONTRACT  RELIGION/DENOMINATION 
Observations in Parentheses for years 1988 (N=891) and 1991 
(N=1492) respectively; EXPEN for year 1991 only 
COV American Baptist(22,42) 
American Baptist Church in USA(9,12) 
National Baptist Convention of America(1,9) 
National Baptist Convention USA(3,2) 
Southern Baptist(102,127) 
Other Baptist(21,23) 
Baptist—Don’t know which (36,87) 
Missouri Synod Lutheran(12, 28) 
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod(3,2) 
 
EXANT African Methodist Episcopal (4,12),  
African Methodist Episcopal Zion (1,4) 
United Methodist (61,105) 
Other Methodist (3,1) 
Methodist—Don’t know which (11,11) 
American Lutheran (10, 32) 
Lutheran Church in America (7,11) 
Other Lutheran (3, 5) 
Evangelical Lutheran (4,12) 
Lutheran—Don’t know which (10,13) 
Presbyterian Church in US (15,12) 
Presbyterian—Don’t know which (12,18) 
Episcopal (16,32) 
No denomination (50,52) 
 
EXPST 
 
 
EXPEN 
Catholic (239,384) 
Other (117,255) 
 
Devil (545) 
 
Note: see text and references for explanation and source of data. 
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Biblical Appendix 
Introduction 
 The model in the accompanying paper relies  on biblical archetypes for religious beliefs 
and contracts in Judeo-Christian theology. The model also implicitly suggests the evolution of 
four contractual archetypes and the possibility of three types of believers or nonbelievers, that is, 
doubting and trusting believers and nonbelievers. This appendix is intended solely to provide 
illustrative examples in a broader biblical context for the model, hence, is neither strictly 
economics, nor theology, and not intended for publication. 
 The broadest and most comprehensive biblical illustration of the progression of  belief 
archetypes used in the model begins with God’s ex post contract with Adam and Eve and Old 
Testament humanity, continues with God’s ex ante contract with New Testament humanity and 
concludes with God’s covenant at the ‘end of history.’  
Old Testament 
 Two initial Old Testament examples involve gifts and consumption of ‘milk and 
honey’ from the Promised Land, but do not involve transforming faith, but we then turn 
to the ‘Exodus’. This biblical cohort of humanity consists of the Israelites who passed 
through the Red Sea and their children who entered into the Promised Land under Joshua, 
followed by the experience of the Israelites from the time of Joshua to the time of David. 
To round out our examples of belief archetypes, we then consider the biblical cohort of 
humanity through history from Adam and Eve to the New Testament incarnation and the 
time of the apostles. Briefly put, nonbelievers and doubting believers are identified with 
Adam and Eve, and believers with transforming faith are identified with trusting 
believers associated with either New or Old Testament covenants. 
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The Exodus 
background  
 The story of Israel’s exodus out of Egypt and the ex post contract God makes with 
Israel on Mt. Sinai is one of the greatest stories of freedom in the bible. It is the major 
event in the Torah. The significance and scope of the Exodus for the people of Israel is 
well summed up in Moses’ speech to Israel east of the Jordan River as they prepare to 
take possession of the Promised Land.   
 Ask now about the former days, long before your time, from the 
day God created man on the earth; ask from one end of the heaven to the 
other.  Has anything as great as this ever happened, or has anything like it 
ever been heard of?  Have any other people heard the voice of God 
speaking out of fire, as you have, and lived?  Has any god ever tried to 
take for himself one nation out of another nation, by testing, by miraculous 
signs and wonders, by war, by a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, or 
by great and awesome deeds, like all the things the Lord your God did for 
you in Egypt before your very eyes?(Deut.4:32-34) 
 
 The story properly begins when God reveals himself orally to Moses as the Lord 
(Hebrew, Yahweh) and chooses Moses to lead Israel out of Egypt as recorded in the book of 
Exodus.  At the same time, the written use of the term Lord begins in the Genesis account of 
Adam and Eve. This suggests that the story of Adam and Eve provides important background for 
understanding the story of the exodus.  In particular, the narrative in Genesis suggests that one of 
the consequences of humanity’s doubt in God’s promises is the establishment of the institution of 
slavery.  The presence of slavery is first described in the story of Joseph in the book of Genesis 
when Joseph’s brothers sell him into slavery and then expanded in the book of Exodus when 
Pharaoh, king of Egypt, takes the nation of Israel as slaves.   
 In the beginning of the book of Exodus, God reveals himself to Moses in a bush which is 
on fire but is not burnt up. When Moses approaches the unusual bush, God tells him that the 
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place where he is standing is holy ground and gives Moses an ex post contract in which he is to 
command Pharaoh, “let my people go.”(Ex 3:10,18) Moses does not want to accept the contract, 
arguing that he does not possess the attributes to accomplish this task and asks God to send 
someone else to do it.  God overrules Moses, endows him with attributes  sufficient to lead Israel 
out of Egypt, and appoints his brother Aaron to help. God then makes an ex post contract with 
Israel in which he tells them he is concerned about them and promises freedom from slavery and 
consumption of ‘milk and honey’ from the Promised Land in exchange for following Moses, 
their deliverer. 
 Instead of listening to Moses’ command, however, Pharaoh makes life harder for Israel 
by requiring them to increase production of bricks, even without straw, and then whips and beats 
them for failure to meet mandated production levels. Israel responds by doubting God’s promise 
of  future freedom and the milk and honey of the Promised Land.   
God’s ex ante contract with Israel 
   Perhaps in response to the problem of doubt in the ex post contract, God makes an ex 
ante contract with Israel in which Israel experiences a series of miracles (an element of V?), 
which God performs against Egypt conditional upon a promise to keep the Ten Commandments.  
These miracles take the form of plagues, beginning with afflictions against the land of Egypt and 
culminating in the miracle of the parting of the Red Sea. In this miracle, God parts the waters, 
brings Israel safely through, and then turns back the waters upon Pharaoh and Egypt, drowning 
the Egyptians in the sea and eliminating both the slavery of Egypt and the doubt of Israel. 
Doubting believers, who remain in doubt through all the plagues, fearful of what Egypt might do 
to them, consume this final ‘Red Sea’ miracle, and are converted. In recognition of their 
conversion, Moses leads all the believers in a song. The first two lines are: 
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 I will sing unto the Lord, for he has triumphed gloriously: horse and rider thrown into the 
sea. 
 
 The Lord is my strength and my song, he has become my salvation: he is my God, and 
my father’s God, and I will exalt him.(Ex.15:1-3) 
 
An ex ante contract with a penalty 
 After the miracle of the Red Sea, Israel begins its journey to the ‘Promised Land’. During 
this journey, God appears to Moses on Mt. Sinai. Moses stays on Mt. Sinai with God for forty 
days and forty nights,’ and receives both the Ten Commandments and provisions for temporary 
violations of the Ten Commandments. However, instead of keeping the Ten Commandments, 
Israel violates the Ten Commandments, frequently reneging and complaining. On one occasion, 
Moses chooses twelve men to spy out the land and bring back some of its agricultural produce. 
The men return with a cluster of grapes and a positive report that the land is flowing with milk 
and honey.  They also report that the people of the land are strong, tall, and live in fortified cities. 
Instead of responding in compliance with the Ten Commandments, Israel complains and quarrels 
against Moses for leading them into ‘certain’ death. As a consequence, God penalizes Israel by 
refusing to allow them to enter the Promised Land.  Even Moses is not allowed to enter in spite 
of his special friendship with God, his meekness, and his example. The consequence of this 
penalty is a renewed commitment on the part of the remaining Israelites to keep the Ten 
Commandments under Moses and Joshua and an increase in good works. 
God’s covenant with Joshua and Israel 
 After the death of Moses, God renews his commitment to Israel by entering into an ex 
post contract and a covenant with Israel.  God’s contract with Israel requires that Israel take 
complete possession of the Promised Land, fighting against the inhabitants of the land. God’s 
covenant with Israel gives them spiritual calm in the land upon condition of transforming faith.   
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 In order to aid Israel in their contractual quest, God promises to fight for them.  If Israel 
does what God says, they will enjoy consumption of ‘milk and honey’ from the entire land.  To 
carry out his promise, God causes the walls of the city of Jericho fall inward, allowing Israel to 
storm the city and take it. God then continues to give Israel the assistance needed to take 
possession of the Promised Land.  Beginning with the city immediately west of the Jordan river, 
Jericho, Israel conquers “all the land, the hills, and all the south country, and all the land of 
Goshen, and the valley, and the plain, and the mountains and valleys of Israel.” God then 
provides rest to Israel from all its enemies and spiritual peace for Israelites who possess 
transforming faith and know that “not one of God’s good promises will fail.”  Thus, through this 
contract, Israel takes all the land God had promised them and has respite from war.   
 To ensure not only physical safety, but also spiritual peace, God enters into a covenant 
with Israel in which spiritual peace is granted to Israel conditional on transforming faith. The 
spiritual peace is reassurance for worry that God’s promises will fail and possession of the land 
will only be temporary. Israelites who enter into this spiritual peace know that “not one of God’s 
good promises will fail” and look forward to continuing peace under Joshua’s leadership. Thus, 
through the covenant and in the context of our model, Israel gains  additional utility afforded by 
transforming faith in God’s protection and care. 
From Joshua to David  
 
God’s ex post contract with Israel after Joshua 
 The story of God’s relationship with Israel between the time of Joshua and the 
time of David primarily revolves around Israel’s attempts to take complete possession of 
the land. After Joshua dies, possession of the land is not automatic. Israel’s neighbors 
have contracts with their own gods and are not friendly toward Israel; the particular ex 
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post contract God makes with Israel promises them continuing additional consumption on 
the condition that they remain faithful to their divine contract and don’t enter into the 
divine contracts with the surrounding nations. Some of the twelve tribes of Israel keep 
this commitment, but other tribes fail to keep this contract, because they doubt God’s 
promise to Israel of additional consumption and prefer the contracts of the nations around 
them.  The situation grows increasingly worse and virtually all the Israelites doubt God’s 
promises and enter into the divine contracts of the nations around them.  
God’s ex ante covenant with Israel during the time of Judges 
 God appears to address the problem of doubting belief by offering a series of ex ante 
contracts to Israel over the course of  roughly  350 years, during which, God provides additional 
‘utility’ (in our terminology) through  the guidance of a judge or leader who enables Israel to 
succeed  against its enemies. The provision of greater utility through the role of judges enables 
successive generations of Israelites to convert from doubting to trusting faith, as they witness the 
additional utility (‘blessings’) God provides.  The Book of judges describes the triumphs of 
Israel under these judges. Samson is perhaps the most famous judge because he is given super 
strength by God, which enables him to defeat the enemies of Israel and to provide additional 
utility for Israel; the story of Samson and Delilah is a literary classic in which Delilah discovers 
that the secret of Samson’s strength is his long hair and then arranges for his hair to be cut , 
making him like any other man. Not to be frustrated, Samson recovers his strength as his hair 
grows back and brings down a mighty wall on top of the Philistines and himself. Samson’s fate  
might be interpreted in our context as a signal that ex ante contracts without a penalty are not a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of reneging. 
An ex ante contract with penalty  
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 The difficulty of the ex ante contracts Israel enters into with God is that the additional 
utility comes only when the judge is alive.  After the death of the judge, Israel always reneges. 
To address this problem, God penalizes Israel by reducing their utility and subjecting them to 
slavery. The penalty leads Israel to seek God and increase their  good works. The pattern of ex 
ante consumption during the life of the judge and then reneging is so frequent that the author of 
the book of judges describes it as a pattern of behavior for Israel over the entire period.   The 
pattern can be summarized as: 
 (1) A generation of Israelites arises who don’t believe God’s promises  
 (2) Israel enters into contracts with the neighbors and their gods  
 (3) God penalizes Israel, subjecting them to slavery  
 (4) Israel accepts God’s contract and rejects the neighbors contracts  
 (5) God provides a judge for Israel who brings additional utility  
 (6) The judge dies and the next generation repeats the cycle 
 
 Eventually, during the time of Samuel, Israel becomes tired of judges and requests a 
divine contract that resembles the nations around them. This means appointing a king to lead 
them in battle.  God is not pleased with this request but abides by it and provides a king for 
Israel, determining to enter into a covenant and a contract with the king and with Israel. 
A contract and a covenant with Israel and King David 
 The king that God appoints to accomplish this is named David, a small shepherd boy 
from the smallest tribe of Israel, who also possesses transforming faith.  God chooses David to 
demonstrate that Israel is best off relying not on  a big strong leader, but on  transforming faith. 
David’s legendary fight with and victory over Goliath with merely a slingshot and some stones 
demonstrate this truth. After his victory, David defeats various nations who have been 
oppressing Israel and establishes centralized worship in Jerusalem extending Israel’s possession 
of the land to the greatest limits in its history. David and his fighters possess transforming faith 
and accomplish their feats as they carry out God’s contract with them and with Israel.  The 
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additional utility received by believers with transforming faith comes in the form of a promise; 
God promises to give all believers with transforming faith a share in an everlasting dynasty made 
with David and his descendants.  Evidence of this is seen in David’s response to God’s promise: 
How great you are, O Sovereign Lord! There is no one like you, and there 
is no God but you, as we have heard with our own ears. And who is like 
your people Israel—the one nation on earth that God went out to redeem 
as a people for himself, and to make a name for himself, and to perform 
great and awesome wonders by driving out nations and their gods from 
before your people, whom you redeemed from Egypt? You have 
established your people Israel as your very own forever, and you, O Lord, 
have become their God. And now, Lord God, keep forever the promise 
you have made concerning your servant and his house. Do as you 
promised, so that your name will be great forever.  
Evidence of additional utility for all believers with transforming faith is also revealed in 
the words of Ethan the Ezrahite in Psalm 89: 
I will sing of the Lord’s great love forever; with my mouth I will make 
known your faithfulness through all generations.  I will declare that your 
love stands firm forever, that you established your faithfulness in heaven 
itself.  You said, “I have made a covenant with my chosen one, I have 
sworn to David my servant, I will establish your line forever and make 
your throne firm through all generations.(Psalm 89:1-4) 
 
New Testament 
 
Jesus, the apostles, and humanity 
 One of the fundamental theological tensions in the New Testament documents is the 
question of when transforming faith actually begins and when reneging ends.  On the one hand, 
transforming faith is not acquired until believers reach perfection in the afterlife because it is 
only in the afterlife when reneging ends. On the other hand, reneging ends with Pentecost, when 
the apostles receive the gift of transforming faith and experience the spiritual increase to utility 
associated with this gift.  From that point onward, the apostles, though they are imperfect, 
satisfactorily do the good works Jesus requires and do not deny their knowledge of Jesus, as they 
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did during the time of his death. Similarly, humans who truly believe the apostles’ message also 
embody the good work It is believed Jesus expects of true believers.  
 This example describes the sequence of arrangements under the assumption that believers 
acquire transforming faith before the afterlife.  In particular, the apostles experience a spiritual 
gift after the event of Pentecost through participation in the ‘Lord’s supper.’  
 The stories of Jesus in the Gospels indicate that Jesus chooses a particular group of 
twelve followers requiring them to leave their homes, their possessions, their families, and their 
neighborhoods to follow him in a larger mission throughout the region of Israel.  In addition to 
these twelve followers, called apostles, a group of women support Jesus out of their means and 
follow him as well. The ex post contract Jesus gives to his followers requires them to identify 
them with him and to do to others what they would have others do to them.  The most difficult 
test of this contract consists of identifying with him during his humiliation when he dies on the 
cross under the condemnation of the Roman Government and the Jewish Sanhedrin.  Completion 
of these requirements is rewarded with consumption of a special meal. 
 Despite the willingness and commitment of Jesus’ apostles and his followers to identify 
with him, the Gospels also indicate that his followers expect Jesus to provide an immediate 
reward through the establishment of a city to fulfill Old Testament promises of a ‘land.’  Jesus’ 
followers do not understand that Jesus promises a spiritual reward for trusting belief. The result 
of this misunderstanding is that his followers do not identify with him during the period between 
his public humiliation and his re-appearance from death and do not do for him what he did for 
them.  Instead, the Gospels indicate that his followers doubt his promise.  
The Passover 
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 Jesus nevertheless makes an ex ante contract with the apostles in which they accept his 
miracles (an element of V?) and participate in the Passover before his death. The Passover is 
described in three different gospels.  The account from the gospel of Luke follows: 
He replied, "As you enter the city, a man carrying a jar of water will meet you. Follow him to the 
house that he enters, and say to the owner of the house, 'The teacher asks: Where is the guest 
room, where I may eat the Passover with my disciples?' He will show you a large upper room, all 
furnished. Make preparations there. They left and found things just as Jesus had told them. So 
they prepared the Passover.  
When the hour came, Jesus and his apostles reclined at the table. And he said to them, "I have 
eagerly desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer. For I tell you, I will not eat it again 
until it finds fulfillment in the kingdom of God." After taking the cup, he gave thanks and said, 
"Take this and divide it among you. For I tell you I will not drink again of the fruit of the vine 
until the kingdom of God comes." And he took bread, gave thanks and broke it, and gave it to 
them, saying, "This is my body given for you; do this in remembrance of me." In the same way, 
after the supper he took the cup, saying, "This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which is 
poured out for you.(Luke 22:10-20). 
 There are features in this account which are helpful for describing the ex ante contract.  
Even though the apostles do not yet have transforming faith when Jesus says these words, Jesus 
looks forward to the time when they will receive the Passover as a covenant meal, termed the 
“Lord’s Supper”, when they possess transforming faith. Thus, In addition, this ex ante contract 
looks forward to the day when the apostles have transforming faith. 
 In spite of the Passover meal, the apostles still do not possess the transforming faith 
necessary to end reneging on promises to God. As a penalty, God subjects the apostles to a 
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penalty of remorse and spiritual deprivation between the period of time between Jesus’ death and 
his re-appearance from death. After Jesus reappears from death, he speaks with the apostles for a 
period of forty days.  During this time, he enters into a contract with the apostles and other 
believers in which he requires them to speak with others about his death, re-appearance from 
death, and entrance into an infinite afterlife with God.  He also tells the believers to gather in 
Jerusalem to await the event of Pentecost, at which time everyone will obtain transforming faith.  
By gathering in Jerusalem, believers renew their good works after the penalty.  
 During Pentecost, the apostles obtain transforming faith. After this event, believers obtain 
transforming faith through the apostles’ activity.  In particular, the apostles begin to administer 
the covenant of the ‘Lord’s Supper’ and believers experience assurance and pleasure as they take 
the elements of the bread and the wine which serve as both a reminder of forgiveness for 
reneging and a spiritual “blessing both in the present and in the future”, something available  
only with transforming faith during either the Old Testament or New Testament periods. 
an ex post contract: the story of Adam and Eve 
 The story of Adam is described in the first three chapters of the book of Genesis.  In 
chapter one, God creates Adam and Eve and gives them similar attributes to his own. In 
particular, God gives Adam and Eve the attributes of goodness and power.  Goodness expresses 
itself in the performance of good works and power expresses itself in productive agricultural 
activity on the earth.  In addition to these attributes, Adam and Eve also possess free-will.  This 
means tAdam and Eve may pursue their own interests instead of God’s interests and may reduce 
time spent in good works from the divine ideal if given the right incentive to do so. 
 In Exodus, Chapter two, God creates a garden in Eden as a place for Adam and Eve to 
live. In the garden of Eden, God places trees and plants that are pleasing to the eye and good for 
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food so that Adam has an incentive to eat from the trees and plants.  Of these trees and plants, 
God places one tree, the tree of life, which potentially yields earthly consumption for an infinite 
period of time.  God also places a tree, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, in the garden.  
God then gives Adam and Eve a specific ex post contract (with a penalty) in which they are free 
to eat from any tree in the garden of Eden, but must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil.  God promises to give Adam and Eve liberty to enjoy fruit from the tree and to 
live for eternity, but threatens them with death if he does not.  
 In chapter three, the writer describes a third party, the serpent, who suggests to Adam and 
Eve an alternative (disingenuous) contract in which they may gain knowledge if they eat from 
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.  This offer leads to doubt concerning God’s promise 
in withholding this source of consumption. Moreover, since the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil is pleasing to the eye and attractive, Adam and eat from the tree and reduce their input 
into the good work of tending God's gift of Eden 
The ex post contract: the story of Old Testament humanity 
 The scriptures indicate that Adam and Eve’s doubt of God’s promise and reduced good 
works are conveyed to all humanity. While the specific form of the contractual prohibition, don’t 
eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, is unique to Adam and Eve, the contract is 
‘reestablished’ for future generations of humans through the Ten Commandments.  Just as God 
required perfect obedience from Adam and Eve through the prohibition as a condition for 
heavenly life, God requires perfect obedience to the Ten Commandments as a condition for a 
heavenly life. Just as Adam and Eve reduce input into good works by eating from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil and forfeit the right to eat from the tree of life, so Old Testament 
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humanity reduce good works by violating the Ten Commandments and forfeit their right to 
consume the ‘milk and honey’ from the Promised Land.  The historical books of Kings and  
Chronicles and the Major and Minor Prophets describe this forfeiture as exile; Even people who 
are described in exemplary terms in the Old Testament and are unlike Israel violate the Ten 
Commandments;  Noah plants a vineyard and gets drunk, Abraham lies and sleeps with his 
wife’s handmaiden, Moses gets angry at Israel and at God, and David commits adultery. The 
implication of Adam and Eve’s doubt is significant: Trusting believers are the exception in Old 
Testament humanity; with the prominent exception of Abraham and the prophets, Old Testament 
humanity consists primarily of doubting believers and nonbelievers. This condition sets the stage 
for God’s offer of an ex ante contract with humanity.   
An ex ante contract for New Testament humanity: stories from the Gospels    
 
 To reach doubting believers, God offers humanity an ex ante contract in which God 
promises salvation conditional on doing good works, which Jesus assigns.  The good works Jesus 
assigns may be summed up in the golden rule:  do unto others what you would have them do to 
you.  Consumption of a meal is figurative but nonetheless real according to the gospel writers.  
For example, Jesus himself speaks of eating of the fruit of the vine in God’s heavenly 
kingdom.(Mt.26:29; Mk.14:25; Lk.22:18)  
 Religious consumption of meals is reported in two ways in the gospels.  It occurs when 
humans ‘taste and see’ Jesus’ miraculous activity. For example, It also takes place when the 
apostles see Jesus change water into wine, when they watch him feed 5,000 people with only a 
few pieces of fish and a few loaves of bread, when a woman who has been bleeding for twelve 
years is suddenly healed, when a man born blind sees, when a leper is cured of his skin disease, 
when Thomas touches Jesus, and when the apostles eat fish with Jesus after his appearance from 
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death. More significantly, religious consumption of a meal occurs in the context of the Passover, 
as mentioned above. In contrast to the Passover of Exodus, the previous example, the Passover 
meal here is public.  
 The result of consumption of the Passover is the conversion of doubting believers and the 
creation of a community composed of all humans who enjoy consumption of the Lord’s Supper.  
This conversion, however, does not eliminate reneging.  Believers may still renege because they 
do not possess transforming faith. As an example, the gospel of Matthew describes Jesus’ 
prediction of the apostles’ reneging in the following way:  After the Last Supper, Jesus says, 
“this very night you will all fall away on account of me.”  Matthew later records Peter’s denial of 
Jesus in fulfillment of this prediction. This denial of Jesus and falling away of believers 
constitutes a reneging of the apostles’ promise to follow Jesus, and a reduction in their good 
works. 
The Covenant  
 As a result of his blinding, Saul’s name and title are changed to the apostle Paul 
and he commits himself to establishing communities of faith throughout the 
Mediterranean region.  Paul’s goal is ultimately to establish a community of faith in 
Rome, a goal which Paul reaches according to the book of Acts.  
  A somewhat humorous example of reneging and asymmetric information occurs with 
regard to two believers on a road going to a village called Emmaus, about seven miles from 
Jerusalem.  On this road, Jesus appears after his death walking with a man named Cleopas and a 
friend . Jesus asks both men what they are discussing and they answer with downcast faces, “Are 
you only a visitor to Jerusalem and do not know the things that have happened there in these 
days?” The men then proceed to inform Jesus about himself without recognizing him.  The time 
they spend doing this reduces their own good works.  After some time, Jesus penalizes them for 
their ignorance by telling them how foolish and slow of heart they are for ignoring the 
predictions of the prophets concerning his suffering and entrance into heaven.  Still, they do not 
recognize him.  Finally, Jesus eats a meal with them and they recognize him after he breaks 
bread and gives thanks to God for it. This recognition leads to an increase in good works, as they 
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speak to others of their experience together. These examples show that while penalties can 
eliminate reneging, there is still a possibility for Pareto improvement via covenants 
 
 
 
